Responses to the Chicago Gun Violence Surge in 2016

Abstract:
This paper presents a policy analysis of the 2016 spike in shootings in Chicago. In addition to reviewing unpublished and published literature, telephone interviews were conducted with two Northwestern sociology department faculty national experts: Wesley Skogan and Andrew Papachristos. The paper provides an overview of the multiple controversies surrounding interpretations and policy implications of how this period is viewed historically.

Public Health Relevance
Between 2015 and 2017 Chicago had a 58% increase in homicides and a 43% increase in non fatal shootings (1). In the wake of one of the worst gun violence spikes Chicago had seen in 2016, the American Medical Association adopted policy calling gun violence in the United States “a public health crisis” requiring a comprehensive public health response and solution(2). "With approximately 30,000 men, women and children dying each year at the barrel of a gun in elementary schools, movie theaters, workplaces, houses of worship and on live television, the United States faces a public health crisis of gun violence," said AMA President Steven J. Stack, M.D(2). Among persons age 1 to 24, deaths caused by gun related injuries are about two times that of cancer, five times that of heart disease, and fifteen times that of infections (3). Gun violence is a major public health problem that is a leading cause of death in this country and deserves attention.

Methods:
I conducted two types of literature reviews. The first was through PubMed using the search term “Chicago Gun Violence”. There were only 36 results and of those results 4 were
excluded as they were discussing how a physician could medically treat gunshot wounds. The rest of the abstracts were reviewed and for articles that specifically discussed the 2016 spike, those references were explored. Google Scholar was also used to find more information using “Chicago Gun Violence Spike 2016” as the search term. Only articles after Jan 1, 2015 were searched resulting in 834 results. Abstracts were reviewed to narrow down to papers that solely discussed possible causes of the spike. Those papers and their references were then examined as part of the literature review.

The second was a review of current news, which was done through two digital newspaper databases: Library Press Display and Chicago Tribune Proquest. Library Press Display was chosen as it allows access up to 7000 newspapers worldwide, allowing the researcher to see how the Chicago gun violence spike was covered and reported in other countries. The search was based on relevance and time, with most recent articles coming first. Headlines and subtitles were read to determine whether or not the full article would be examined based on relevance to my research paper. Chicago Tribune Proquest was also searched using the same terms and articles that dated no older than Jan 1, 2015 were examined. Chicago Tribune was chosen for local media coverage due to granted access via Northwestern Galter Library.

Two phone interviews were conducted with two experts on the subject of the 2016 Chicago gun violence spike: Wesley Skogan and Andrew Papachristos. It was opted to use a semi-structured interview with a set of predetermined questions, which was sent to both interviewees beforehand. However, the actual interview itself was open to flow off script depending on the course of the conversation. The researcher was also able to ask follow up
questions that were not listed in the set below depending on the content of their answers. This style of interview allowed an in-depth analysis of particular issues that were thought to be important, and limited pre-conceived bias in shaping the interview, while the set questions acted as an itinerary that ensured that the main topics would be covered during the set time. The listed set of questions and a summary of their answer are in Appendix I for Skogan and Appendix II for Papachristos.

Wesley Skogan is a political scientist at Northwestern University’s Institute of Policy Research. He was co-editor of a policy-oriented report from the National Research Council, *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*, and he chaired the committee that produced it. Professor Skogan received the 2015 Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence- Based Crime Policy from the Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy.

Andrew V. Papachristos is a Professor of Sociology and the Director of the Northwestern Network and Neighborhood Initiative. Papachristos’ main research applies network science to the study of gun violence, police misconduct, illegal gun markets, Al Capone, street gangs, and urban neighborhoods. He is actively involved in policy related research, including the evaluation of gun violence prevention programs in more than a dozen U.S. cities. He was awarded a NSF Early CAREER award to examine how violence spreads through high-risk social networks in several U.S. cities.

**Results:**

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**Characteristics of the 2016 Spike in Shootings**

One of the most striking features of the increase in gun violence was how sudden it was. As of December 2015, there was no indications that gun violence was on the verge of rising and homicide rates had stayed relatively flat since the mid 2000s. As background, like most of the US, Chicago saw a marked decrease in violence crime starting in the 1990s (although gun violence rates never fell as low as those in New York and some other large cities)(1). The lowest homicide total was in 2004. However, beginning in Jan 2016, homicides and shootings surged relative to their 2015 levels every month (1). This increase was restricted to gun crimes as other reported crimes did not change by nearly as much (1).
**Cause of the 2016 Spike**

University of Chicago Crime Lab Report

One of the most comprehensive analyses that provided a picture of Chicago’s crime problem in 2016 was written by the University of Chicago Crime Lab (1). Their findings suggested that most of the violence stemmed from altercations in public places with a gun ready at hand, and it showed that the violence was highly concentrated: five of Chicago’s seventy-seven neighborhoods accounted for nearly half of the increase (1). Further, this violence continued to disproportionately affect the city’s most disadvantaged residents: most gun violence victims and perpetrators were African American men, who had more often than not had some prior encounter the criminal justice system. But despite strong claims made by both sides in political debates, the Crime Lab report noted that there was no evidentiary basis to draw clear conclusions.

However, the suddenness of the increase in gun violence helped rule out many candidate explanations for why there were so many more shootings in Chicago 2016. Things like lax gun laws in nearby states, the manner in which local courts handled gun cases, or social conditions like poverty and racial segregation could not explain the phenomenon of 2016 because those factors did not abruptly change at the end of 2015 (1). The researchers also examined factors such as weather, the number of citywide arrests and spending on education and social services, but found that none changed by enough to explain the shooting surge.

One of my interviewees, Professor Skogan agrees with the Crime Lab report in that “we’re talking about a gun spike when we talk about the great spike of 2016,” (4). As shown in Figure 1, Professor Skogan agrees it is the gun homicides that drove this spike.
He also agrees that the violence was extremely concentrated within just a handful of neighborhoods, including Austin, Garfield Park, North and South Lawndale, Englewood and West Pullman, which accounted for 50% of all shootings in 2016 (4).

**Social Disorganization Theory**

This clustering of crime to particular areas of a city is described by the social disorganization theory, which grew out of research conducted in Chicago by Shaw and McCay (22). Using spatial maps to examine the residential locations of juveniles referred to Chicago courts, Shaw and McKay discovered that rates of crime were not evenly dispersed across time and space in the city. Instead, crime tended to be concentrated in particular area, and remained relatively stable within different areas despite continual changes in the populations who live in those areas. In neighborhoods with high crime rates, the rates remained relatively high regardless of which racial or ethnic group happened to reside there at any time and as these previously “crime-prone
groups” moved to lower crime areas of the city, their rate of criminal activity decreased accordingly to correspond with the lower rates characteristic of the new area (22). Thus, Shaw and McKay concluded that crime was likely a function of neighborhood dynamics, and not necessarily of the individuals within that neighborhood (22).

To answer the question about what the characteristics of various neighborhoods were that accounted for the stability of crime rate, Shaw and McKay proposed that areas of economic deprivation had high rates of population turnover since these areas were undesirable residential communities and people left as soon as it was feasible for them to do so. Also, the socio-economically deprived areas tended to be settled by many immigrants, resulting in ethnic and racial heterogeneity. As such, these areas had high rates of residential mobility and racial heterogeneity, or as Shaw and McKay coined it, they were “socially disorganized” (23). In these areas, conventional institutions of social control (schools, churches, community organizations, etc.) were weak and unable to regulate the behavior of their neighborhoods’ youths (23).

The social disorganization theory has been adjusted and expanded over the decades, but it is worth mentioning the basic premise as their theory does accurately describe the continuous high rates of crime in the handful of Chicago neighborhoods that account for more than half of Chicago’s violence.

**Clearance Rates**

Professor Skogan has also mentioned at a previous Northwestern Policy Research Panel that the most disturbing feature of the 2016 spike is the fact “…we’re not catching anybody”(4). The ability of Chicago Police to solve gun violence has plummeted to single digits. Because crimes
have gone unsolved, the standard model of policing (police receive a call, investigate, and arrest someone) has collapsed.

He elaborated on this vicious cycle of violence during the phone call interview. When clearance rates fall, there are three main effects that all lead to increased firearm violence. First, the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system go away- if you can shoot someone with impunity, you might as well commit the act because you can get away with it. Second, if the police have a reputation of not being able to catch anyone, young people feel the need to protect themselves by taking pre-emptive action. Third, if someone is shot, the victims’ families and neighbors cannot trust the criminal justice system to provide justice- they feel the need to take matters into their own hands. And thus, you get an explosion of firearm violence.

The homicide clearance rate has steadily declined in the United States from 91% in 1965 to 62% by 2012 (5). Figure 1 below gives that national decline in percentages for homicide arrests from 1960 through 2006. The trend of homicide clearances in Chicago followed a similar pattern- it declined from 94% in 1965 to 65% in 1995 (6)
Clearance rates are sometimes called “solved” crimes and are obtained by dividing the annual number of arrests by the number of homicides and multiply by 100. When compared to other industrialized countries, the clearance rate in the US has been significantly lower. During 1999-2000, Australia had a clearance rate of 86%; England and Wales had a rate of 81% during 2005-06 and Canada had a rate of 73% in 2005 (7).

So why are clearance rates so low in the US? The research literature on homicide clearances explores two conflicting perspectives. While there is variation in the use of terms, the first theory (extralegal or discretionary perspective) takes a view that homicide detectives engage in “victim preferencing”. In this view, the victim characteristics relating to class, race, gender, and age determine how vigorously and thoroughly case are investigated (8).

Black wrote in 1980:
“The murder of a prominent politician, businessman, or socialite is likely to be handled with greater diligence and fanfare, whereas that of a homeless man on ‘skid row’ is apt to be classified merely as a ‘death by misadventure’ (or some similar label) and accorded no investigation of any kind.” (10)

The second theory is called the nondiscretionary, or solvability perspective and it states that police respond with maximum efforts and willingness to clear every homicide, but “…they may not do it with the same willingness and effort as other offenses” (9).

If extralegal or discretionary factors are important in explaining variations in arrest clearances, then clearance rates would be higher for white victims than black victims. If the latter position is taken and police work equally hard at clearing homicides regardless of the victim’s social or demographic characteristics, then the factors differentiating clearances are nondiscretionary and depend on characteristics of the homicide even. For example, clearance rates would be higher for offense where witness are available, and weapons are used that provide forensic evidence.

Although at first glance, the dropping homicide clearance rates is more prevalent in the black community of Chicago, it is premature to say the first theory holds true to describe Chicago’s decreasing clearance rates. Gun violence itself is much more prevalent in the poor, black communities and it may be due to the nature of the homicide cases themselves than the victim characteristics that we see this disparity (11). However, although it is true that clearance rates dropped in 2016, it is most likely that these rates were dropping because of the spike in violence,
not vice versa given the police did not drastically change their policing tactics during the two years.

Proximate Causes of the 2016 Chicago Shooting Spike

So, then we are back to the original question- what really caused this spike? According to Skogan, a spike is by definition unexpected, outside the range of anticipation and typically difficult to explain. He believes there are certain forces that caused the spike but why the spike took place in 2016 versus 2015 or any other year, he says, is more debatable. He believes that there was a spark in 2015, that lit a fire underlying community factors to create this surge. No one can say exactly what the spark was comprised of, but it would be negligent to write off the great effect of November 25, 2015 when a video of Laquan Mcdonald getting shot and killed was ordered to be released. It would also be perfunctory to overlook the state budget impasse. Although the disrupted funding did not change sharply at the end of 2015, it definitely played a role in creating the milieu that primed a gun violent year.

Laquan Mcdonald and the Ferguson Effect

Mcdonald, a black 17 year old, was shot 16 times and killed by a white police officer in October 2014, but video of the incident was not made public until a judge ruled that it had to be released more than a year later on Nov 24, 2015. The release was followed by intense protests, the firing of police Superintendent Garry McCarthy, first-degree murder charges against Officer Jason Van Dyke, and a yearlong U.S. Department of Justice investigation that found officers had routinely violated the rights of minorities for decades.
No expert can deny that this event had some effect on creating the milieu for the spike of violence in 2016. Some crime experts felt that the fallout over the McDonald video caused officers, fearful of becoming the next viral video, to pull back on their aggressiveness, which emboldened criminals to take advantage of the vacuum. This sentiment has been previously termed the Ferguson effect.

After some cities saw a rise in crime in 2015, police chiefs and even the head of the FBI, James Comey, suggested that America as a whole was experiencing this effect. This term comes from the 2014 police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The theory went that police officers sensitive to public scrutiny in the wake of the protests of Brown’s killing were pulling back on police work and emboldened criminals were seizing their chance. The evidence of any such effect nationally was mixed, and so the Ferguson effect became the Bigfoot of American criminal justice: fervently believe to be real by some, doubted by many others, but never attested to by any hard evidence.

James Comey, who during a speech at the University of Chicago in October 2015 professed himself at least open to believing the phenomenon is real, did acknowledge this lack of clear proof of a connection (12). There have been anecdotal stories that argue criminals are getting bolder, but most argument for the Ferguson effect come down to coincide and hand waving. One example of a story is in Baltimore, where violent crime spiked after Freddie Gray’s death in police custody in April 2015(12).
As discussed above, as there was no one theory that could explain the surge of 2016, by itself, the Ferguson theory was one of many theories that were being discussed. However, it should be noted that by giving credence to the Ferguson effect risks cutting the police-reform push that came from the Laquan shooting off. Imagine that the spike in crime really is a Ferguson effect and police have drastically pulled back from policing for fear of being caught on camera. The implication of the Ferguson effect argument is that police cannot provide safe streets and low crime rates without massive civil rights violations- aggressive use of physical force, racial profiling, searches that fall into legal gray areas- without alienating black communities. On the other hand, if the Ferguson effect is not real and the rise in crime is being created by a confluence of “real” factors like cheap drugs, it may be reversible. Unfortunately, if the Ferguson effect is real, as Comey as well as some other crime experts have suggested, and the current system can only provide security by means of questionable or “warrior” policing in communities of color, then American policing is much more troubles have been willing to acknowledge.

**Warrior vs Guardian Policing**

Warrior policing is associating with the idea of militarizing police and is consistent with the traditional view of police work—to search, chase, and capture. On the other end of the spectrum is “guardian” policing, which emphasizes social service, valuing community partnerships and establishing positive contacts. There is currently no good data that shows that the Ferguson effect is true, but there is enough anecdotal and observational data to suggest that as the negative impacts of “warrior” policing has come to light, the Chicago Police Department is being pushed to change in the other direction.

**State Budget Impasse, Ceasefire and the Contagion Theory of Gun Violence**
In March 2015, Illinois’ Republican governor and Democratic legislate failed to agree on a State budget. Thus began the 793 day long budget crisis, which is the longest state budget impasse in the nation since the great Depression. At first glance, the State’s budget cut and the city’s surging gun violence appear to have nothing to do with each other, but a closer examination reveals that with no budget, the state implemented broad based program cuts. These cuts included eliminating State funding for Chicago’s Cure Violence/ Ceasefire programs. Data shows that gun violence in the city began a surge upward after the State’s budget cuts. There is also an observational linkage between the Cure Violence funding cuts and Chicago’s spiking homicide rate (13).

Cure Violence is a Chicago based non profit organization founded in 2000 by Dr. Gary Slutkin in affiliation with the University of Illinois-Chicago School of Public Health. Slutkin asserts that gun violence is an infections disease and like any other infection, gun violence exhibits the following signs and symptoms (15):

a) contagion: one event leads to another
b) predictive morbidity (injury) and mortality (death)

c) pattern distribution: spreads in predictable ways

d) pattern disruption: target interventions can slow and reverse its spread

In accordance with this hypothesis, Cure Violence treats gun violence as an infectious disease and goes to urban neighborhoods to intervene and limit its spread. There organization operates by using three well defined strategies: 1. Detecting and interrupting conflicts, 2. Identifying and treating high-risk individuals and 3. Changing social norms (14).

Until March 2015, Cure Violence operated in 14 high risk Chicago neighborhoods. They embedded trained “violence interrupters” and “behavioral change agents” within high risk communities. These professionals worked to identify signs of impending violence and would intervene to cool tempers, buy time, and shift perspectives. However, on March 4, 2015, funding from the state of Illinois was suspended and about half of the staff from CeaseFire was laid off and by July 2015, most of the staff was laid off. This decrease in staffing had major impact on program activity and many clients in the community were left without support (14).

In the 6 months before the budget cut, CeaseFire sites were averaging 81 mediations of high risk conflicts per month, but in the 12 month period after the cut, the remaining programs averaged only 30 mediations per month. Beyond the timing of the increased violence coinciding with the cuts to CeaseFire, the places where the historic increase in violence had occurred also coincided with the place where the program has been cut. The districts where the CeaseFire programs were cut were the districts where violence increased the most, accounting for 94% of the total citywide increase in shootings (13). As show in Figure 10 (13), the fourth district was the only district that
had reductions in the shootings (57 fewer shootings and 6 fewer homicide than the mean baseline). This district is the location of the only CeaseFire program that was able to independently find funding and continue running (13).

Responses to the 2016 Spike in Shootings

Data: Official Chicago Police Department data

Figure #10 – The only district with decreases in both shootings and killings was the 4th district, which is also the only district where CeaseFire maintained a full program. The places of greatest increase were districts that had previously had CeaseFire programs, including the 11th district, which had a longstanding, strong program.

So, the real question is, what did Chicago do? Did we implement policies or programs that actively changed the trajectory of gun violence, or was 2016 a transient phenomenon with no attributable cause nor solution?

**Strategic Decision Support Centers**

Although researchers could not pinpoint a cause of the 2016 surge, the city most definitely did not shy away from formulating a response. In February 2017, the Chicago Police Department began setting up new district offices for police and analysts from the Crime Lab to track trends, predict trouble and deploy resources accordingly. The first offices called the Strategic Decision Support Centers (SDSCs) were located in Englewood and Harrison. Since then, the department has expanded its use of SCDCs to 20 of the 22 police districts (16).

SCDCs represents a new approach to gun violence prevention that is designed to help police commanders target their resources to the right place at the right time. SDSCs are rooms in which technology, district leadership, and analysts (trained by the University of Chicago Crime Lab) work together to develop localized crime reduction strategies using collaborative intelligence, data analysis, and input from the community. These efforts are tailored to meet the unique needs
of each community, with community concerns incorporated into the district's daily planning process (17).

Max Kapustin, research director of the University of Chicago Crime Lab, assisted with the effort to set up SDSCs. His team’s report mentioned earlier in this paper (1) was the one that most clearly showed the Chicago violence in 2016 was an enigma; however, its decline in the following two years seem more explainable. There are still difficulties around data of gun violence since there are a lot of facts that are not observable. For example, changes in conflicts between individuals who would engage in gun violence is not something that can be recorded in a dataset somewhere. Nevertheless, it seems possible to attribute the two annual consecutive declines of homicides and nonfatal shootings to a few specific interventions if you specifically examine particular areas.

The clearest example of this is the SDSC in Englewood, a district that saw an enormous increase in 2016. Kapustin was able to show that the moment the SDSC was introduced, gun violence fell dramatically and has stayed low (17). Because of the amount of gun violence Englewood historically produces, a drop in this area had an impact on citywide numbers. Unfortunately, the impact of SDSCs in other districts are a little less clear as there are many other factors at work. However, Englewood itself does show that policy changes did affect the course of the violence surge.

Kapustin believes SDSCs are effective as they have brought about a massive change in policing and management practices in the districts that have them. These centers allow the people who
have information to get together in the same room, share that information, and formulate
decisions based on all known factors. Sharing of information across silos and using data to
inform decision making was unfortunately not commonplace at CPD prior to SDSCs.

The SDSCs was only one of the many great changes the CPD would undergo in the subsequent
years after the 2016 spike. After the 2015 video release of Mcdonald, we saw the trial and
conviction of Jason Van Dyke, and eventually in January 2017 there was the Department of
Justice report, which called the Chicago Police Department’s use of force excessive and racially
discriminatory. The report explains why trust in the CPD simply does not exist for many in the
Latino and Black neighborhoods (18). Soon after the withering report, CPD issued a new use of
force policy emphasizing the “sanctity of life” and started holding training sessions for officers.
Finally, now beginning in 2019, Chicago police are undergoing the next step of change now
under federal oversight as the department officially begins an overhaul. Federal Judge Robert
Dow Jr. and an independent monitor will oversee the changes in hopes that a consent decree is
able to change the CPD behaviors that have created so much distrust between police and
communities (18).

**Consent Decree**

Under the consent decree, there are many more changes in store. This January, Judge Dow
signed on the decree that gives him oversight of CPD’s transformation into a police force trusted
by all Chicagoans. This milestone is longer overdue, with mayors and police superintendents
making promises time and time again to fix dysfunction ad get rogue cops off the streets. None
of the promises held and Chicago had paid out $662 million in settlements over police
misconduct from 2004-early 2016 (19). Eradicating the “Dirty Harry” policing that was outlined in the DOJ report will require changing the rules, the accountability structure and the culture of the police force. Early steps have been taken: new equipment such as body cameras for officers are hitting the streets, and the city has replaced its ineffective Independent Police Review Authority (which hardly ever held officers accountable for their actions) with a stronger oversight agency called the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (19). Further, new rules have been coming forward. For example, the Department must produce a monthly report about use of force incidents; it bans police from using Tasers on people who are simply running away. The agreement also expands mental health services for police, including an initiative for suicide prevention (20).

**Future of the Consent Decree**

Chicago is among fourteen other law enforcement agencies in the country under federal oversight, and the efficacy of a consent decree seems dependent on the city. The police department in Ferguson, MO, where a fatal police shooting sparked nationwide protests and helped spur the Black Lives Matter movement has shown to have a lot of resistance to the new practice of policing. On the other hand, Mayor Jenny Durkan says that for Seattle, after six and a half years of oversight, the Seattle’s police department was well in compliance (20). However, Richard O’Neil, with Seattle’s police union, states otherwise- he says it has damaged police morale.

"Well, It was very frustrating from the beginning," he said. "The incentive to get out and be a proactive officer I think has been damaged and, something the city can't deny anymore, that we have [taken] a real hit in recruiting, retaining officers."(20)
Although it is unclear exactly how this decree will begin to change the police community relationships in Chicago, it’s clear from looking at the other cities that this will be a long process. Repairing the broken relationships between citizens and police will take time.

**Cure Violence Returned**

Another reason for the decreased violence since 2016 may have been the return of CV programing. In 2017, funding returned and the program is now implemented in 13 communities and four trauma centers (13). Currently, in partnership with local community based organizations, the program operates in West Englewood, Grand Crossing, South Shore, Auburn Gresham, Roseland, North Lawndale, Humboldt Park, South Chicago, Rogers Park, Uptown, Little Village, Southwest, and Grand Blvd. as well as in four major trauma centers in Chicago — Advocate Christ Medical Center, Mount Sinai Medical Center, Stroger Hospital of Cook County, and Northwestern Memorial Hospital.

**Next Steps**

In my interview with Papachristos, we discussed what the future of gun violence “treatment” looks like in Chicago (Appendix II, Question 4). We discussed whether the city should invest resources into prevention and root causes by investing in children, their education and mental health, or whether we provide those resources to hit the highest risk population (mid 20s, black men who have criminal history backgrounds) to bring down gun violence numbers now. Papachristos made it clear he believes these two strategies should not be mutually exclusive because in order to move gun violence forward, we need to hit everything.
In a report called “We Carry Guns to Stay Safe”, the Urban Institute describes a research project designed to better understand how young adults in four of the city's most dangerous neighborhoods experience gun violence, learn more about gun availability and gun carrying in those neighborhoods, and point to solutions that can help reduce the violence (21). This survey stood out because it showed that the question about whether to end gun violence in Chicago it's more important to focus on immediate solutions or to take a longer view and address its root causes is a false choice.

The research collected data firsthand from of 345 adults from 18 to 26 years old conducted in Austin and North Lawndale on the West Side, and Auburn-Gresham and Englewood on the South Side. The paper found that guns are a fact of life in Chicago's most violent neighborhoods. Fully one-third of respondents said they've carried a guns, and almost all reported carrying illegally, without a Firearm Owner's Identification card or concealed carry permit (21). They said they carry guns for their own protection or to protect their friends or family members. The research showed how readily accessible guns can be with 69 percent saying it would take them a matter of hours to get their hands on a gun (21). This research reinforced how easy availability of guns fuels Chicago's gun violence and is a daily reality for our residents and our police officers.

Of those surveyed, more than a third had been shot or shot at, and 85 percent knew someone close to them who had been shot or shot at (21). As one of the community partners working with the Urban Institute put it, "Hurt people hurt people”(21). This research shows that we must treat the underlying trauma and victimization impacting so many of our young people, intervening as quickly as possible for young people hurting emotionally and potentially intending to seek revenge.
As discussed throughout this paper, young people in Chicago's violent neighborhoods do not trust the police and do not fear arrest. The lack of trust and confidence in the police was among the starkest findings in the survey. As shown in Figure 9 below, fewer than 10 percent see police as honest, fair or respectful (21). Likewise, only 16 percent of those who reported having carried guns said they thought it was likely they'd get caught for carrying a gun illegally, and just 10 percent said they were likely to get caught if they shot at someone (21). Rebuilding trust between the police and community members is an imperative, and one that the consent decree repeatedly mentions as its top priority.

![Figure 9: Perceptions of Police Legitimacy](image)

However, this research also showed that poverty, the root cause of gun violence to which many experts point is a fact of life for these young people. Among survey respondents, 40 percent
reported annual household income of less than $10,000 (21). When asked what it would take to
get them to stop carrying guns, the most common answer, repeated by nearly 60 percent of
respondents, was a job. Lack of economic opportunity is not far removed from violence.

This survey response makes it very plain that our immediate issues in Chicago are also the root
causes of violence. The ready availability of guns, trauma and victimization, absence of trust
between police and community, and the lack of economic opportunity are all both root cause and
urgent symptoms of gun violence. We cannot waste time debating which ones to prioritize as
they must all be attacked with immediacy and sustainability.

It's been said that those who are closest to the problem are also closest to the solutions, and
indeed the efficacy of programs like CeaseFire and these on the ground surveys show that is
indeed true.
1. Chicago’s 58% jump in homicides in 2016 fueled fierce debate about its cause— you’ve previously discussed how a lot of this violence was due to low clearance rate and really driven by high risk, predominantly African American neighborhoods. Can you elaborate, and are there any other factors you would like to speak to?

- Spike is by definition unexpected, outside the range of anticipation- typically difficult to explain and there are reasons to believe that there are forces but why it happened in 2016 vs 2015 is more debatable

- What is it that sparked it? Prime suspect waiting in the wings would be the stirring up of the events of Laquan McDonald Nov 25, 2015. What can be said about 2016 for sure is that every month was more ahead of 2015- so whatever was spiking was continue to spike. Thus, there was the short term media, and community outrage effects but there wer also long range things.

  o Collapse in the clearance rates (homicide and shootings- what spiked was are the ones not being solved)

  o Not solving crimes: a lot of things come from that

    - 1. The deterrent effects of criminal justice system go away- if you can shoot someone with impunity, might as well because you’re getting away with it. The immediate effect of being pursued and caught has gone away.

    - 2. If police can’t catch anyone what do you do if you’re a hanging out on the corner? You can’t wait until you’re shot- you take pre-emptive action- if you think you’re going to be shot, you better act. And thus, you get explosion of pre-emptive fire arm violence
3. After the event: if someone is shot, what do their families and neighbors and young male friends- where does justice come from? Vengeance and reciprocal shootings? Who shot them? Let’s go get them- shoot in revenge – no justice in criminal justice system

- vicious cycle- put together anticipatory self protection and after the fact retaliation and now everyone out there is carrying

2. Why do you think the spike of 2016 downtrended in the following years?

- In addition to underlying forces which were pertinent in 2015, there were temporary forces that produced the spike

- Laquan mcdonald had effect on other young men. The trial influence was the views and activities of the community.

  - If Von Dyke walked free that would’ve been LA in 1993, which was the biggest and most violent riots

- It’s no accident that following 2015, police woke up and realized community policing is down to nothing- increasing budget, new staff and energy into renewing police

3. Do you think there is a role model police force? Can you talk to me about what you think is the future of policing in Chicago and nationally? Where do you think Chicago’s police stand in the range between police as an occupation force vs community policing?

- Unclear, uncertain

- Huge amount of ground work has been laid- huge foundation has been laid by the consent decree. Now we have an independent monitor and a federal judge to ensure there are changes in management of police department. This is maybe only 15% of what they needed, but still valuable and we’ll have to see what comes of the decree
- But foundation is there: monitor, budget for monitor, consent decree, judge/ independent monitor, and management changes. There are new people at the top of the organization, so we can see what comes of this reform.

4. Can you talk to me about why gun violence is soaring in Chicago while New York is doing safer than ever?

- The economy is different. Inequality in economy is similar in LA, but there’s a huge difference in that LA’s majority population is Latin American, not African American. It’s a whole different demographic.

- New York also has a completely different demography.

- Also the two are quite different organizations – NYPD is professionally run and well resourced. The mayor has deep pockets and continuous oversite into its activity and the organization itself has auditing and a research layer that keeps an eye on how they’re doing. New York is very professionally run/managed.
Appendix II: Andrew Papachristos

1. Given your research on social networks, what do you think were the causes of the Chicago gun spike of 2016?

- I have no idea. Still a big question mark

- Network research suggests there were networks in the city where gun violence went up and others where it went down. There are 900+ gangs or groups in city- you can have intervention work with 200 of those gangs and they can stop shooting, but then crime can still go up because the other gangs have become more active. There are no specific answers about how the different group dynamics changed in 2016, but network suggests you probably had activity happen in very particular parts of these networks

- The average age of a homicide victim in Chicago is 25-26. Programs that would have had to change to affect homicide rate immediately would have had to be involving young men, who have been in contact with justice system. Ceasefire is one of those programs. However, even if the program itself is effective overall, for specific instances you need to ask were the interrupters with the right people? There are a limited number of outreach workers-do you have coverage and are you with the right groups? These are the questions you need to ask from a network perspective.

2. Why do you think the spike has decreased since?

- there are a lot of things that are good, but when you look at trend we don’t know yet if the trend will continue to go down or if it will return to pre 2016 levels
- if you look back at 90s, post 2006- homicide rates are pretty stable and then there was a spike in 2016 and now were back down to pre spike levels. Maybe we will just level out here, or well continue to go down, or we may spike again. We don’t know.

Follow up: What are the good changes that happened since the spike?
- concerted effort across agencies to focus their actions. People were working smarter. Within world of policing for example, you can drive crime rates down by making fewer smarter arrests rather than ramping things up
- The reform/consent decree was thrown in there as well- there are many levers being added at this point, but we don’t yet know the long term effects.
- Programs such as cure violence had improved street outreach
- Also there are a host of new programs that are targeting those most at risk: mid 20s, black, history of interaction with the justice system. These programs are offering cognitive behavioral therapy, assessing job readiness, etc.
- Remember that the highest risk population are in their mid 20s. Doing school programs is great, but if you want to drive down gun violence levels today you need to look at the older people. The 20s are a harder population to deal with since there are many more factors to think about (need to give them health services, keep them out of jail, clean, steadily employed); they are a really tricky population to deal with because we don’t know what works

3. You’ve said that the networks in Chicago work like the networks in Cincinnati- can you describe how that’s true and how they differ from networks in NYC or LA?
I’ve worked across many cities, and realized certain things are inherently human. Crime, gun violence are all group phenomena. There are certain things involved in violence that require network; simple presence of third party can make things worse or better. Think about a dispute at a party, if a third friend is there they can tell you either “let’s get out” or fuel the dispute with “let’s get revenge”. These are all inherent group dynamics that the networks within big cities have.

Within the network, gun violence tends to concentrate. Even in networks with risk factors (male, black) most people don’t get shot, and those who do get clustered because it’s contagious. Within the network, if person A is a victim at time1 and victim B is time 2, the spread happens in a predictable fashion. This predictability is what’s similar between cities.

Networks are like highway systems—how fast you drive, whether you wear a seat belt, whether there are potholes are what differs. Chicago has many potholes and fewer exit signs.

Comparing NYC and Chicago is hard because Manhattan is essentially gentrified, and Chicago is in process of gentrifying like crazy. Also, police reform in NYC has changed, and it has done a lot of things to change behavior, that Chicago has not yet done.

I don’t know a lot about LA, but the Chicago conversation today around police reform, looks like LA after Rodney King. It is not a comparison between Chicago today and LA today, but rather LA 20 years ago.
4. Your theory suggests that gun violence is not just an epidemic, but has specific network patterns that might provide opportunities for interventions- can you describe some of those interventions? Does our current police model take into account the effect of these networks?

- You need to identify your point of interventions. For example to stop an infectious disease epidemic your points may be at needle exchange, work programs, and sex worker health supports

- We need to do that for gun violence- we need violent interrupters and get our police to the proper intervention points

  - some of our high risk population need employment, some need trauma care, some need education

- you need to do everything all at once. If our goal is to drop homicide rates then investing in 12 year old will not do anything today. But,if you want it in 12 years then it’s worth it

- We need to invest in our 12 year olds in order to invest in gun violence prevention, but we need to invest in our 25-26 year olds as well since they are the ones that are creating violence today.

But as mentioned before this age group is very hard- they have no public care. No dcfs, no educational system, no foster care, no food stamp- they are aged out of any program. The tragedy is that the only way to get health care and education over 22 year old is through the criminal justice system

- The solution is you need to do all of it together as a cohesive strategy; it would be a poverty reducing strategy.
References:


